We examine the eect of medical marijuana laws (MML) on crime treating the introduction of MML as a quasi-experiment and using three dierent data sources. First, using data from the Uniform Crime Reports, we nd that violent crimes such as homicides and robberies decrease in states that border Mexico after MML are introduced. Second, using Supplementary Homicide Reports' data we show that for homicides the decrease is the result of a drop in drug-law and juvenile-gang related homicides. Lastly, using STRIDE data, we show that the introduction of MML in Mexican border states decreases the amount of cocaine seized, while it increases the price of cocaine. Our results are consistent with the theory that decriminalization of small-scale production and distribution of marijuana harms Mexican drug tracking organizations, whose revenues are highly reliant on marijuana sales. The drop in drug-related crimes suggests that the introduction of MML in Mexican border states lead to a decrease in their activity in those states. Our results survive a large variety of robustness checks. Extrapolating from our results, this indicates that decriminalization of the production and distribution of drugs may lead to a drop in violence in markets where organized crime is pushed out by licit competition. * Michael Braun, the former chief of operations for the D.E.A., told me a story about the construction of a high-tech fence along a stretch of border in Arizona. "They erect this fence," he said, "only to go out there a few days later and discover that these guys have a catapult, and they're inging hundred-pound bales of marijuana over to the other side." He paused and looked at me for a second. "A catapult," he repeated. "We've got the best fence money can buy, and they counter us with a 2,500-year-old technology." New York Times, Keefe (2012) 
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Introduction
Most illicit drugs in the US are supplied through Mexico and every year around 6 billion dollars nd their way back across the border as prot for the large drug tracking organizations (DTOs) (Kilmer et al., 2014) . DTOs are major contributors to crime in US border states. They are often allied to local gangs and the smuggling of illicit drugs is known to be paired with violence as DTOs are willing to protect their products with lethal force (National Gang Intelligence Center NGIC, 2011). Possibly as a result, Mexican border states have a 15 percent higher crime rate than inland states. As such, it is no surprise that US law enforcement has focused a large part of its eorts and resources on deterring DTOs from importing their drugs into the US. A prime example of this is given in the quote on the top of this page. Yet, as the quote indicates, even the most advanced techniques are easily avoided by the Mexican drug trackers. In practice, US eorts to curb the import through Mexico seem to have a limited impact on the supply of drugs and crime in the US.
In this paper we argue that a dierent strategy may be more eective at decreasing the role of Mexican DTOs in US crime. Medical marijuana laws (MML) have been introduced in more than twenty states across the US. These laws allow the consumption and production of marijuana for medical purposes. In most states medical purposes can range from severe conditions such as cancers to milder conditions such as (perceived) headaches or back pain.
They de facto decriminalize small-scale production of marijuana, when the drug is intended for personal use, or for sale in a marijuana dispensary. 1 We argue that the main dierence between states with and without MML is not the availability of marijuana but the origin of the drug. Many studies show marijuana is widely available in states without MML in place (E.g. National Drug Threat Assessment Report NDIC, 2011 , Kilmer et al., 2014 . While marijuana markets were traditionally rmly in the hands of Mexican DTOs, according to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment Report (NDIC, 2011) , US production of marijuana has increased more than twofold in the period 2005-2009. 2 This increase in local production of marijuana in MML states decreases the market share of Mexican DTOs in the largest drug market in the US. Therefore, MML provide a quasiexperimental variation where the increased drug production within the US hurts the prots of DTOs, in dierent states and at dierent points in time. If MML are indeed eective at decreasing the activity of these drug trackers, we should see that MML lead to a decrease in crimes committed by DTOs and their aliated gangs within MML states. Since DTOs and their aliated gangs conduct most of their criminal activity in Mexican-border states, it follows that the introduction of MML should reduce drug-related crime and drug tracking particularly in those states.
Several articles in popular media suggest that MML and the later legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington indeed aect the activity of Mexican DTOs (e.g. articles from the Washington and Hungton Post Khazan, 2012 , Miro, 2014 ,Knafo, 2014 . Price data also indicates that MML has had a negative impact on Mexican DTOs. The quality-adjusted price of marijuana has decreased by 6 percent in the period 2009 (UNODC, 2014 . However, to our knowledge a statistical analysis linking MML to criminal activity of Mexican DTOs within the US is still lacking.
To test our theory we use crime data from 2 dierent sources. First, we use the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data which records felony crime rates for all US states. UCR is a panel data set with violent and property crime rates for each state, split into seven crime categories. Second, we use the Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) data. SHR gives information on the circumstances surrounding homicides committed in the US. As such, we can see whether homicides are related to drug violence. Both data sets cover the time period 1990-2012.
Our methodology is a dierence-in-dierences analysis where we divide states into three groups: i.) a treatment group of states with MML at the Mexican border, which is our main treatment group of interest ii.) a treatment group of inland states with MML, and iii.) a control group of states without MML. In addition, we include multiple control variables as well as state-specic linear time trends, that control for observed and unobserved time-variant heterogeneity between states.
Our results on the UCR data indicate that there is no signicant relationship between the introduction of MML and crime. This conrms earlier analysis in Morris et al. (2014) and Alford (2014) . However, we do nd a signicant negative relationship between MML and crime in states that border Mexico. In particular, we show that in those states the violent crime rates decrease signicantly. Our central estimate suggest that violent crime decreases by a little less than 6 percent, with the strongest eects on robberies and homicides which decrease by 14 and 12 percent, respectively. The geographical heterogeneity in the treatment eect suggests that the decrease in crime in states that border Mexico may have had something to do with the activity of DTOs.
Moreover, a further split-up in homicides applying SHR data shows that MML decrease drug-law and juvenile-gang-related homicides by 48, and 33 percent, respectively. This split-up strongly suggests that MML decreases homicides related to drugs and gang activity. Although the decrease in drug and gang violence could potentially be unrelated to the role of Mexican DTOs, we consider it highly unlikely, since prior to MML virtually all drugs were distributed by Mexican DTOs, and a large number of gangs within Mexican border states hold direct alliances with Mexican DTOs (e.g. NDIC, 2011 ,NGIC, 2011 .
In order to look closer into the drug market we use a third data source: the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). This data records narcotic seizures and prices of drugs, thereby allowing us to investigate the eect of MML on the market for illicit drugs. We exclude marijuana from our analysis, since MML may have a mechanical eect on the seizures of marijuana. The STRIDE data cover the period 1990-2007. Using STRIDE data we nd that MML decrease the amount of (crack and powdered) cocaine seized in states bordering Mexico. Our central estimate suggests the amount seized decreases signicantly by 85 percent for powdered cocaine, and 83 percent for crack cocaine, although standard errors are very large. In addition, the price of powdered cocaine increases signicantly at all distribution levels. These estimates indicate that MML in Mexican border states coincides with a negative supply shock. This gives further support to our theory that MML aect the overall activities of DTOs in border states, and furthermore, suggests that the supply of marijuana is complementary to the supply of other drugs, most prominently cocaine. 3 We perform several robustness checks to conrm our results. Most notably, MML in Mexican border states appear to have a negative eect on property crime. However, placebo tests indicate that the estimated treatment eect is biased downward (more negative) due to heterogeneity in crime trends between treatment and control states. As such, it is unclear whether the estimated eect is indeed (entirely) the result of the MML treatment eect. No such conict arose with a similar placebo test for violent crimes. Beside this test, we study the eect of heterogeneity in MML between states. In particular, Pacula et al. (forthcoming) and Alford (2014) note that there may be a dierence between MML that only allow for home cultivation and MML that allow for marijuana dispensaries. This would be a concern, if dierences in the specic allowances of MML are correlated with their geographical proximity to the border as this would contaminate our results. However, we nd that as we control for dierences in MML, the eect of MML on crime at the Mexican border remains. We nd that violent crime at the Mexican border is unaected by MML that allow for home cultivation, but opening the rst licensed dispensary has a signicant negative eect on crime, although we should note that the identication of the latter eect is weak since most states with MML open their rst licensed dispensary one or two years after the adoption of MML.
We also consider the dynamic eect of MML by including lags of the treatment variable in our regression analysis. We nd that the lagged coecients are signicant for violent crime. This may indicate that the full eect of MML on activity of Mexican DTOs may only appear in crime rates after a few years.
Our research is of importance to policy makers who consider legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana production in their jurisdiction. The results presented in this paper indicate that MML has a negligible direct impact on crime. However, they decrease crime indirectly by aecting the position of violent Mexican DTOs, and their aliated gangs. We expect even stronger eects of full legalization of marijuana production, since this will allow for large-scale production by corporations, likely pushing the DTOs completely out of the protable market for marijuana. Thus, legalization might prove to be a way to diminish the power of organized crime structures. Of course, in its decision to legalize marijuana the government should weigh these benets against the relevant costs related to marijuana legalization.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature. The third section provides a theoretical link between MML and crime. The fourth section describes the data while the fth section discusses methodology and the results. The sixth section presents robustness checks. The nal section concludes.
Related Literature
MML have recently become a popular instrument for a variety of societal issues related to drug consumption, including crime (See e.g. Anderson et al., 2013; Chu, 2012 Chu, , 2013 Pacula et al., forthcoming; Morris et al., 2014; Alford, 2014) . Most related to our study are Morris et al. (2014) , and Alford (2014) which investigate the relationship between MML and crime. Morris et al. (2014) nd no signicant relationship between MML and crime, with the exception of homicides for which the relationship with MML is signicantly negative. We conrm this nding, but we also show that there is a signicant negative relationship between MML and crime in the Mexico border region. Alford (2014) studies the eect of specic MML characteristics on crime. In particular, she nds that MML which allow for dispensaries have a positive eect on both violent and property crimes. We partly replicate this result at the Mexican border. We show that crime is negatively related to home cultivation, but positively related to the state-wide allowance of dispensaries. However, in some states, including the largest MML state California, many counties licensed dispensaries prior to their state-wide allowance (see also the discussion in Anderson and Rees, 2014) . When we consider the opening date of the rst licensed dispensary, we nd that home cultivation has a non-signicant eect on crime, while dispensaries have a negative eect on violent crime in Mexican border states. Identication of the additional eect of dispensaries is weak, since the rst licensed dispensary usually opens 1 or 2 years after the introduction of MML. However, this evidence suggests that the opening of dispensaries does not increase crime.
There has also been some evidence of the eect of the decriminalization of marijuana possession on crime abroad. In particular, Adda et al. (2014) looks at the eect of depenalization on crime in a London borough. They nd that overall crime fell, while possession oenses increased and persisted even after the policy ended. In another UK quasi-experiment, Braakman and Jones (forthcoming) nd no eect of the 2004 decriminalization in the UK on crime and drug consumption. Unlike MML the decriminalization in the UK had no eect on the legal status of marijuana production which remained strictly illegal throughout the policy experiment.
The market for marijuana is strongly interlinked with the market for other illicit drugs. It is often argued that marijuana is a complement to the demand of other drugs, in a theory often known as the gateway drug hypothesis. According to the theory, after consumption of marijuana users are more likely to consume habitually other illicit drugs and, thus, marijuana acts as the gateway drug. However, empirical evidence is mixed, with some papers nding that consumption of marijuana causally increases the demand for other drugs (e.g. DeSimone, 1998; Ramful and Zhao, 2009) , while others nd no eect (e.g. Van Ours, 2003; Morral et al., 2002; Chu, 2013) , and some even indicating that marijuana is a substitute to the consumption of other drugs(e.g. Model, 1993) . Chu (2013) uses MML to test the gateway drug hypothesis and nds no signicant eect of MML on the arrests for possession of other drugs. Moreover, using substance treatment admission data, he rather nds that MML may decrease heroin treatment admissions. We add to this literature by arguing that marijuana may also be a complement to the supply of other drugs. In particular, we show that MML lead to a negative supply shock of other illicit drugs. As such, empirical tests for the gateway hypothesis should take into account that illicit drug markets are interlinked both in demand and in supply.
In addition to the relationship between marijuana and other illicit drugs, there is another strand of the literature which examines the complementarity in demand between marijuana and alcohol use. Anderson et al. (2013) nd a signicant negative eect of MML on alcoholrelated accidents and survey-reported alcohol use. Both results indicate that marijuana and alcohol are demand substitutes. This nding corresponds with earlier results in DiNardo and Lemieux (2001) who show that an increase in the drinking age increases marijuana consumption. On the other hand, Pacula (1998) shows that marijuana consumption decreases with the beer tax, indicating that the two goods are complements. Additionally, the results of Anderson et al. (2013) could not be replicated in Pacula et al. (forthcoming) using various other survey measures of alcohol use. We add indirectly by studying the degree of complementarity in de-mand between alcohol and marijuana through the eect of MML on alcohol-related homicides. With our data we do not nd a signicant relationship, although we should add that this may be due to the relatively small number of alcohol-related homicides.
Background
In this section we introduce the main theoretical framework linking MML to the supply and demand of illicit drugs and the crime rate. First, we describe the legal impact of MML on marijuana consumption and production. Second, we explain the link between MML, DTOs and the demand and supply of illicit drugs.
Legal Impact of MML
Prior to MML marijuana was strictly prohibited in some states and decriminalized in other states in a policy that typically dates back to the 1970's. 4 If the drug was prohibited, this meant that even possession and use of small quantities of marijuana could lead to punishment in jail. If the drug was decriminalized this meant that the penalty for possession of small quantities was limited to a small ne. In either case, prior to MML no state allowed for any form of production or distribution of the drug.
When a state introduces an MML it allows patients to consume marijuana for medicinal purposes. The most important of these purposes is pain reduction, and most states with MML allow doctors to prescribe marijuana as a pain killer for general complaints related to pain, such as migraines and back pain. Since it is dicult for the doctor to verify whether pain complaints are real, MML de facto make marijuana legally available for a large group of patients'.
Patients with a prescription for marijuana can generally obtain the drug in two ways. First, they are allowed to grow a limited number of plants in their own homes. Second, in some states patients can obtain marijuana from marijuana dispensaries. 5 If dispensaries are allowed they are typically organized as co-operative associations (collectives). Members of the collective can either be producers, consumers or both. If a dispensary has x patients, the producers of the dispensary are on aggregate allowed to grow x times the number of plants allowed for a single patient. In some states/counties producers can be a member of multiple dispensaries allowing them to scale up their production substantially, but in other states/counties this is not allowed. In some states MML do not explicitly allow or disallow dispensaries. In those states dispensaries may receive a license from the county. Overall, even though farmers run the risk of federal prosecution, and legislation diers between states, it is clear that MML signicantly reduces the probability of imprisonment for small-scale marijuana farmers.
In gure 1 we present a map of the United States, where states with MML are shaded. Most relevant for our study is the Mexican border region. As can be seen, in this region all states except Texas have adopted an MML. Table 1 presents an overview of the MML. As can be seen, most states with MML allow for home cultivation from the moment the MML becomes eective. However, many states did not (Gieringer, 2003) . Moreover, some states allow for dispensaries but do not have one, or saw the rst one opening some years after the specic allowance. Therefore, we have added a column to the table with the date in which the state rst opened a licensed dispensary. These dates are partly the result of work by Anderson and Rees (2014) and of a report by DEA (2013) which documents the opening of dispensaries for some states. In the case of California these sources could not conrm the rst opening of a licensed dispensary. Therefore, we conducted a Google search to see when the state opened its rst licensed dispensary. Several sources, among which Novack (2012) , conrmed that the rst licensed dispensary opened in 1997 in San Francisco. MML appear to have increased the supply and demand of both legal (medical), and illegal marijuana within the US. Turning rst to demand, Pacula et al. (forthcoming) nd that MML lead to an increase in self-reported use of marijuana. Chu (2012) shows there is a positive relationship between MML and marijuana-related arrests, indicating that when MML are in place, illegal demand for marijuana increases. Although we are not aware of a similar study in the US, Walsh et al. (2013) shows that MML in Canada also substantially increase the demand for (legal) medical marijuana.
On the supply side NDIC (2011) shows that the illegal production of marijuana within the US as measured by plants eradicated has increased twofold in the period 2005-2009. 6 To our knowledge no data is available on the growth in production of (legal) medical marijuana, but given the large number of dispensaries on, for example, the popular website http://www. weedmaps.org, it appears as if legal production covers a large part of the marijuana market.
Overall it appears that production of marijuana within the US has grown faster than demand. Kilmer et al. (2014) show that demand has grown, by a pace of 46 percent in the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , while the data in NDIC (2011) indicate that illegal production alone has grown by more than a 100 percent. As such, MML have very likely lead to a drop in market share of the Mexican DTOs.
DTOs, Drugs and Crime
In Mexico there are 7 major DTOs that control almost all the drug trade between Mexico and the US (NDIC, 2011) . Through most of our sample the Tijuana Cartel, located on the Mexican West-Coast, is the largest DTO. However, in recent years this cartel is falling into decay, and the Sinola Cartel located in the center of Mexico has replaced its role as Mexico's largest drug cartel. Sinola's annual revenue is estimated at 3 billion US dollar (Fortune Magazine Matthews, 2014) .
The main activity of Mexican DTOs is drug distribution. Within Mexico DTOs are strictly geographically separated, and each controls its own territory and smuggling routes into the US. Once the drugs enter the US, DTOs sell their drugs to aliated gangs. The aliated gangs each have a presence in at least one of the four Mexican border states. This likely indicates that representatives of the DTOs do not often venture farther North than the border states. 7 The aliated gangs distribute the drugs further into the US (NGIC, 2011; NDIC, 2011) .
DTOs and their aliated gangs are well-known for their contribution to violent crime along the Mexican border. In particular, they have been known to engage in kidnapping, assaults, robberies and homicides in Mexico and in the US (NGIC, 2011; NDIC, 2011) . Perhaps as a result, crime rates in states on the Mexican border are 15 percent higher than in inland states.
Drugs sold by the DTOs can be roughly categorized into four categories: marijuana, cocaine, opium-based drugs of which heroin is the most important, and synthetic drugs, most prominently methamphetamine. All DTOs are diversied and sell a range of these drug products. This diversication strategy is likely optimal, since DTOs and their owners do not have access to capital markets. Diversication allows drug kingpins to smooth their consumption. Moreover, retained earnings of one drug can be used to pay investment cost on other drugs.
In this respect, marijuana plays a special role. Heroin and other opium-related drugs are usually imported from South-America or Asia. Mexico has recently increased its production of poppy plants (UNODC, 2010 (UNODC, , 2014 , from which heroin is produced, but even locally produced poppy has to go through laboratory renement in order to create heroin. Cocaine has to be purchased from Columbian DTOs. Production of synthetics requires laboratory equipment. As such, production of each of these drugs, in particular at the large scale required for the DTOs, requires major investment. On the other hand, marijuana can be grown in Mexico with almost zero up-front cost, and it is the largest drug market in the US. Finally, prior to MML Mexico had a virtual monopoly on marijuana in the sense that they were by far the largest producer of marijuana in North America (UNODC, 2010 (UNODC, , 2014 . Therefore, marijuana is probably a major cash crop for the DTOs. As such, it is likely that proceeds of marijuana are used for investment in the other drugs 8 .
If MML introduced in a state on the Mexican border causes the state to produce more marijuana this can have severe repercussions on DTOs and their aliated gangs. Smuggling routes to the state decrease in value as both the demand and the price for one of the major drugs falls. Moreover, the DTOs may have less cash available to invest in the other drugs. Therefore, in the medium to long run we expect a (partial) retreat of DTOs from states with MML at the Mexican border. This leads to a decrease in crimes committed by the DTOs, as well as a decrease in the supply of illicit drugs in the state.
Anecdotal evidence supporting this theory is the demise of the Tijuana cartel. The main smuggling routes for the Tijuana cartel lead to California which was the rst state to introduce MML in 1996. Part of the demise of this cartel may therefore be explained by MML in California. 9 In addition, articles in popular media suggest that locally produced marijuana is aecting the prots and activities of DTOs as discussed in the introduction.
We can study this theory in more detail using crime data. In particular, if MML aect crime through their eect on DTOs we would expect that the treatment eect of MML on crime is stronger (more negative) in Mexican border states than in inland states. Moreover, we would expect that the strongest decrease occurs in drug -and gang-related crimes such as homicides, assaults and robberies. In addition, whenever the circumstances behind the crime can be established, we expect those circumstances to be related to drugs or gangs.
The theory also predicts a decrease in overall supply of drugs from Mexico. Hence, we can use drug data to establish whether MML decrease drug seizures, excluding marijuana seizures, in Mexican border states, and whether they increase their market price. Therefore, in the remainder of our paper we aim to establish whether MML have decreased crime and drug smuggling in Mexican border states. Moreover, we establish the circumstances behind the drop in crime in Mexican border states when possible.
Alternative Theories
MML may have also aected crime through dierent channels. Goldstein (1985) discusses three main channels through which drugs can aect criminal activity. First, through thè pharmacological channel drugs may increase aggression, and therefore, violent crime. Second, there is an`economic channel' in that drug users may resort to crime in order to nance their drug habit. Finally, there may be`systemic channel' because drug contracts cannot be enforced in the courts, and hence, disputes between drug market participants are often solved with violence.
Moreover, according to the drug gateway hypothesis, after consumption of marijuana users are more likely to consume habitually other illicit drugs and, thus, marijuana acts as a gateway drug. If this is the case MML may have increased the demand for other drugs. 10 However, unlike the DTO channel, these alternative channels do not have a clear geographical dimension. For example, if MML increase the demand for heroin through the gateway drug hypothesis, we would expect this to occur in both New Mexico, and Washington. 11 However, when the drop in crime is specic to Mexican-border states, DTOs are the most likely channel.
Data Description
We use three dierent data sets to test the eect of MML on crime in Mexican border states. First, we use UCR data for data on overall crime rates. Second, we use SHR data , which allows us to examine the homicides by circumstances. Lastly, STRIDE data (1990-2007) on illicit drug seizures and price allows us to examine the relationship between MML and illicit drug markets. In this section we describe each of our datasets in turn.
Uniform Crime Reports
All local US law enforcement agencies collect data on reported crimes. Summaries of this data are submitted to the FBI and reported as the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The data include the number of violent and property crimes reported per year in each state per 100,000 inhabitants. Violent crime is subdivided in the following categories: homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, and forcible rape. Property crime is subdivided in burglary, larceny theft, and motor vehicle theft. Unfortunately, not all crime types are reported in the UCR data. Among others, UCR data does not contain information about crimes that are often linked to criminal organizations in general (and Mexican DTOs specically) such as, drug crimes, kidnapping, human tracking, (credit card) fraud, and extortion. With respect to drug crimes, we try to circumvent this by using the STRIDE data described below. Unfortunately, to our knowledge no common data source exists for the other crimes, and as a result we exclude them from our analysis. Table 2 presents summary statistics.
Supplementary Homicide Reports
The Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) data provide incident level information of a homicide, as reported by the UCR agencies, and collected by the FBI. The data include information of the relationship between a victim and an oender, demographic characteristics of both the victim and oender, types of weapon used and circumstances behind the homicide. Of particular interest for our study are the circumstances. The SHR data classify circumstances behind homicides into 21 categories of which the following ve (9 percent of the homicides in the SHR) are related to our study: drug law (3.9 %), juvenile gang (1.5 %), gangland (0.9 %), homicides committed under the inuence of drugs (0.7 %) and homicides committed under the inuence of alcohol (2 %). Drug law homicides are homicides that are related to a violation of narcotic drug laws (e.g. drug tracking or manufacturing), juvenile gang homicides are homicides that are related to a juvenile gang, gangland homicides are all homicides related to organized crime (except juvenile gangs), and the other two categories speak for themselves. Whenever a homicide may fall under multiple categories, for example an organized crime related homicide committed under the inuence of drugs, it is only reported under the more serious oense.
STRIDE Data
Data on the drug market come from the STRIDE dataset provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). STRIDE data records seizures and (undercover) purchases of drugs by law enforcement ocers. It provides rich information including the number of seizures, the quantity seized and the price for each purchase. Drugs are divided in 5 categories: marijuana, powdered cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, and heroin. For the purpose of this study we ignore marijuana, since MML may have a mechanical eect on the seizures of marijuana. summary statistics of the variables used in the estimation of the results. The rst super row present statistics from the Uniform Crime Reports dataset, the second super row presents statistics from the Supplementary Homicide Reports dataset, the third super row present statistics from the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence dataset. The fourth super row presents our MML independent variables, while the last super row presents the control variables. a All UCR and SHR crime statistics are measured as the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. b Powdered cocaine quantities smaller than 2 grams are classied as street level, quantities between 2 and 10 grams are low distribution level, quantities between 10 and 50 gram are high distribution level, and quantities larger than 50 are considered wholesale level. For crack cocaine quantities smaller than 1 gram are street level, quantities between 1 and 15 gram are distribution level and quantities greater than 15 are wholesale level. For methamphetamine quantities smaller than 0.1 gram are excluded, quantities between 0.1 and 10 gram are considered street level, quantities between 10 and 100 grams are distribution level and quantities greater than 100 grams are wholesale level. For heroin quantities quantities smaller than 0.1 gram are excluded, quantities between 0.1 and 1 gram are considered retail level, quantities between 1 and 10 grams are distribution level and quantities greater than 10 grams are wholesale level.
Our STRIDE data runs from 1990 up to 2007, since the data is only released several years after analysis. STRIDE data only provides information on samples of drugs which are send to the DEA lab for analysis. Unfortunately, not all drugs seized in the US are sent to the DEA lab. As such, STRIDE data does not contain information on all drug seizures in the US, and the sample may not be representative for drug seizures in the country. With regard to the amount of seizures and the quantity seized this issue will not bias our result unless the measurement error is correlated to the introduction of MML which we consider unlikely.
However, issues with the price data have been well established in the literature (Arkes et al., 2008) . First, we adjust for ination and report all prices in 1990 US dollars. Second, the data contains some outliers which are likely the result of a mistake at data entry. Therefore, for powdered and crack cocaine, and methamphetamine, prices per gram less than $2 as well as more than $3000 are excluded. For heroin, prices per gram less than $7.5 and more than $ 10000 are excluded. Third, for some years some states report zero seizures to the DEA. We consider it unlikely that a state has zero drug seizures during a year and therefore treat these zeros as missing observations. Our results are not qualitatively aected if we use zeros instead of missing values. Finally, the price of drugs diers signicantly by the distribution level at which the drugs are purchased. Drugs purchased at the wholesale level tend to be cheaper than the same drug sampled at the retail (street) level for the simple reason that each distribution level takes a prot margin. Hence, a comparison of price data between states and over time is not possible unless we classify the price by the distribution level at which the drug is seized. We follow the recommendations given in Arkes et al. (2008) . In particular, we distinguish between small seizures which are likely the result of seizures at the retail level, medium seizures which we classify as distribution level seizures, and large seizures which we classify as wholesale level seizures. The exact overview of our classication as well as summary statistics are given in table 2. Arkes et al. (2008) show that this classication scheme leads to consistent pattern in price comparison between metropolitan areas and over time.
MML and Control Variables
Our main independent variable is a dummy variable for introduction of MML. An overview of the relevant dates and characteristics of each law can be found in table 1 in section 3.1.
Control variables in our analysis come from the following three data sources: National Cancer Institute, the U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We include as control variables for our analysis the shares in the population of: males, African Americans, Hispanics, people aged between 15-24 and people aged between 25-34. Furthermore, we add unemployment rates, (log) income per capita and a dummy when a state decriminalizes marijuana (instead of endorsing an MML). Each of these statistics is known to correlate with the crime rate (see e.g. Tauchen, 2010) . Moreover, we consider it plausible that these variables may be correlated with the introduction of MML. Therefore, the estimate of the treatment eect may be biased if we do not control for these variables in our analysis. Summary statistics are presented in table 2.
Methodology and Results

Empirical Strategy
We test our theory empirically with a xed-eect regression of the following form:
where y st is the outcome variable in state s and period t, D st is the treatment dummy which takes value zero if a state has not (yet) enacted MML in period t and one in if the state has enacted an MML, B s is a dummy which takes value one if a state is located at the Mexican border and zero otherwise, α s are state-xed eects, γ t are time-xed eects, X st is a vector of control variables, the term S s=1 δ s t are state-linear time trends and ε st is the error term. The outcome variables are (logs of) dierent crime rates, drug seizures, and drug prices, such as the property crime rate, the homicide rate, the number of cocaine seizures or the price of heroin.
In the regression equation parameter β M B captures the eect of an MML on the outcome variable in Mexican border states, while β rest measures the eect of an MML in states that are not located on the Mexican border. Our theory can be tested statistically by establishing whether the treatment eect, β M B , is signicantly smaller than zero for the relevant outcome variables. We estimate our model through population-weighted OLS and cluster the standard errors at the state level.
In order to get an unbiased estimate of the treatment eect in border states, it is crucial to choose the correct specication. The simplest version of our regression equation without control variables and state-linear time trends is equivalent to a simple dierence-in-dierences specication with two treatment groups, i.) States at the Mexican border with MML, and ii.) Inland states with MML, and a control group; states without MML. However, the validity of the standard dierence-in-dierences methodology depends on whether the outcome variable in treated and untreated states evolves according to a common trend. The common-trend assumption may be violated for two reasons.
First, states that introduce an MML may dier from states that do not introduce an MML in time-variant observable characteristics. This is an issue if the observable characteristic is correlated to both the crime rate and the presence of MML, since in that case the estimate of the treatment eect may be biased. To control for time-variant observable characteristics we add a number of control variables that may be correlated to crime as well as the introduction of MML in X st . The control variables are listed in section 4.4.
Second, states in the treatment group may dier from the control group in time-variant unobservable characteristics. These time-variant characteristics may for example correspond to time-variant culture or the political climate in a state. To control for this issue we add statespecic linear time trends in our main specication. These trends terms capture all unobserved heterogeneity that evolves linearly over time. Unfortunately, we cannot guarantee that all unobserved heterogeneity evolves linearly over time. Therefore, we assess the robustness of our main analysis with respect to time-variant heterogeneity through a placebo treatment which we describe in section 6. Table 3 shows our main results. In column 1 we see that a general MML dummy has a nonsignicant impact on the violent crime rate. This nding corresponds with results in Morris et al. (2014) and Alford (2014) . However, columns 2 and 3 show that the eect of MML on violent crime is signicantly negative at states bordering Mexico. In the simple dierence-indierence model without control variables and linear time trends, the estimate suggest that the introduction of MML reduces violent crime by approximately 20 percent. 12 When we include control variables and state-specic linear time trends the estimated coecient decreases. This suggests that observed heterogeneity, as well as linearly evolving unobserved heterogeneity between states bias the coecient downward. This could be the case if, for example, states that are more likely to introduce MML are also more likely to have a downward trend in crime rates. Hence, the model in column 2 may be misspecied. However, even after we control for these observables and unobservables, the coecient is still signicantly negative and our preferred specication, presented in column 3, suggests that the introduction of MML decrease the violent crime rate at the Mexican border states by approximately 5.8 percent. The coecient for non-border states is never signicant, indicating that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that MML did not aect the violent crime rate in those states. Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants in state s at time t as measured in the UCR data. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the property crime rate. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, the share of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level.
UCR Results
Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The ndings for the property crime rate are similar to our ndings for the violent crime rate. Column 4 shows that MML do not have a signicant eect on property crime, again conrming the ndings in the literature. However, the eect in Mexican border-states is signicantly negative. The estimate presented in column 6 suggests that the introduction of MML decreased property crime at the Mexican border states by approximately 12.6 percent.
On the other hand, the coecient presented in column 6 for non-border states is signicantly positive indicating that MML increased crime at non-border states. This indicates that MML lead to an increase in property crime in non-border states of about 5.1 percent. However, both results on property crime have to be interpreted with caution. A placebo test in the next section shows that the estimated results on property crime are strongly driven by dierences in crime trends between treatment and control states. In particular, in the placebo test the positive eect on inland states disappears completely, while the negative eect on crime in Mexican border states decreases signicantly. As such, the estimated coecients are likely an overestimate of the actual treatment eect. Note: The dependent variable in each column is the log of the crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed in the column header in state s at time t. In the UCR data crimes in column 1-4 are listed as violent crimes, while crimes in column 5-7 are property crimes. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state xed eects, year xed eects, control variables and state-specic linear time trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Table 4 splits the results of our preferred model with state-linear-time trends and control variables by detailed crime category. The dependent variable in each column is the log of the crime rate reported in the column head. As can be seen, MML at the border has a signicant negative eect on the violent crimes homicide and robbery. The eect on aggravated assault and forcible rape is non-signicant. For violent crimes our central estimates suggests that homicides decrease by 11.5 percent and robberies decrease by 14.1 percent. Our estimates shows that MML decrease property crimes at the border, and increases property crime in non-border states, but again this result should be interpreted with caution.
The results on violent crime are in line with our theory as outlined in section 3. In particular, violent crimes such as robbery and homicide, which are linked to both Mexican DTOs and gangs associated with DTOs, decrease after introduction of MML in the Mexican border region where we know that DTOs have a strong inuence on the crime rate. Forcible rape is unaected, and this crime is indeed not commonly associated to systemic drug violence. More surprising is perhaps the non-signicant eect of MML on aggravated assaults in Mexican border states, since assaults are often linked to drug violence. This could for example be explained by the fact that victims of drug violence are unlikely to report the crime to the police. Table 5 shows result from the supplementary homicide data. The dependent variable in the reported regressions is the homicide rate in each category. Unlike in the previous regression, we do not take the log of the homicide rate, since some states have zero homicides in a particular category in a particular year. 13 As can be seen, the introduction of MML at the Mexican border signicantly reduces homicides related to narcotic drug laws, and juvenile gangs. In addition, there is a signicant, but smaller, negative eect on juvenile gang killings in non-border states. Determining the magnitude is slightly more dicult, since the model is estimated in levels rather than logs, and the homicide rate in California is much larger than in the other two MML states at the Mexican border. To be more precise, if the juvenile gang homicide rate in New Mexico and Arizona would decrease by -0.564 as our central estimate suggests, the homicide rate in this category would turn negative for those states. Hence, we interpret the magnitude of our coecients by dividing them by the overall average homicide rate in each category in California prior to introduction of MML. Using this interpretation, our central estimate suggests that MML have decreased drug-law related homicides in California by 48 percent, and the juvenile gang homicide rate by 33 percent.
Supplementary Homicide Results
Both homicides related to narcotic drug laws, and juvenile gang killings are oenses which are often linked to Mexican DTOs, and gangs aliated to the DTOs. Hence, these results further corroborate our theory that MML have negatively impacted crime related to DTOs in Mexican border states. The magnitude of the estimate is surprisingly large, although we should take into account that the standard error is large as well. Morris et al. (2014) suggest that the decrease in the homicide rate seen in the UCR data may have been caused by the fact that users in MML states have substituted marijuana for alcohol, which in turn decreased the amount of homicides under the inuence of alcohol. We nd no evidence for this hypothesis in the supplementary homicide data. Instead the decrease in homicides is the result of a drop in drug-and gang-related violence. Table 6 reports the results of MML on drug seizures using the STRIDE data. The dependent variable in the rst 4 columns is the log of the quantity seized by the police of, respectively, powdered cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine and heroine. The pattern that emerges from the seizure data of STRIDE appears to be consistent with our theory that MML have decreased the supply of other drugs, in states at the Mexican border. The fact that we only nd a signicant eect for cocaine could be due to the fact that cocaine is the largest drug market after the market for marijuana, and prior to 2009 it was actually the largest drug market (see Kilmer et al., 2014) . As such, cocaine seizures are more common than seizures for other drugs, and hence, our estimates are more precise for this drug than for other drugs.
STRIDE Results
Moreover, DTOs are known to have replaced marijuana plants with poppy plants (Miro, 2014; UNODC, 2014, e.g.) . Hence, we do not expect the supply of this drug to decrease very much as a result of MML. Finally, methamphetamine has clear alternative supply chains, since it can also be produced within the US. As such, one would also expect lower complementarity between the supply of this drug and marijuana.
We caution in interpreting these results. In particular, as discussed in the data section, STRIDE data is noisy, and likely not representative of drug markets in the US. Indeed, the magnitude of the point estimates is in our opinion implausibly large and we nd that the standard errors are also large, which creates some doubt on the value of the central estimate.
Note that the observed drop in seizures does not appear to be consistent with a theory where law enforcement agencies shift resources from marijuana to other drugs. In that case we would expect an increase in other drug seizures, whereas we actually observe a decrease. Thus, these results may be interpreted as statistical evidence that MML at the Mexican border has decreased drug tracking of cocaine. Table 7 reports the estimated eect of MML on the price of drugs as measured by the STRIDE data, at various distribution levels. As can be seen, MML at the Mexican border signicantly increase the price of powdered cocaine at all distribution levels. Eects are again large, but also very noisy. For the other drugs no pattern arises that is consistent among the Note: The dependent variable in the rst 4 columns is the logged quantity seized by the police of the drug reported in the column header, while the dependent variable in the last 4 columns is the logged count of seizures of these drugs in state s at time t as measured in the STRIDE data. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state xed eects, year xed eects, control variables and state-specic linear time trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalisation policy, unemployment rate, logged income per capita, the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34. The panel covers the period 1990-2007. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Results shown are the same as when having the raw dependent variable. Asterisks denote: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Note: The dependent variable is the logged price of the drugs purchased, each supercolumn is disaggregated into several distribution levels as outlined in table 2. The distribution level of each column is marked at the bottom. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state xed eects, year xed eects, control variables and state-specic linear time trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the share of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2007. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. distribution levels. Prices in states that are not at the Mexican border are unaected. The result on powdered cocaine is in line with our hypothesis that MML have decreased the supply of all illicit drugs in Mexican border states. Such a decrease in supply should lead to a decrease in quantity traded as well as an increase in the price as we have shown in table  6 and table 7. We do not obtain equally supportive evidence for our theory from the other drugs. This could be the result of the quality of the STRIDE data which may be too noisy to pick up these eects. Table 8 shows the dynamic eects of the introduction of MML on crime using UCR data. In addition to the standard specication table 8 include lags of the treatment dummy. This, to some extent, allows us to determine how long it takes for MML to reduce the crime rate in Mexican border states. It is important to note that we only include up to two years of lags, since the nal treatment at the Mexican border takes place in Arizona in 2010, 2 years before the end of our data.
Dynamic Eects
As can be seen from the results in column 2 and 3, MML at the Mexican border does not signicantly reduce violent crime right after introduction. The negative eect of MML on crime only becomes signicant two years after introduction. This lag in the treatment eect can be easily explained through our theory. If MML reduced the activity of the Mexican DTOs, it is unlikely that this happened right after the introduction of the law. It takes some time to set up American marijuana production facilities, such that in the rst years after the introduction of MML, most of the marijuana supplied in Mexican-border MML states still came from Mexico. Moreover, even after US facilities for marijuana production were created it is unlikely that this led to an immediate retreat of the Mexican DTOs from the American marijuana market. Finally, in accordance with the literature we coded laws that have been legalized in the month of December of a given year as occurring in that year, even though it would be more plausible that their eect is rather referred to the next year. A lag in the treatment eect is therefore to be expected.
On the other hand, the reduction in property crime appears to happen right after the introduction of MML in Mexican border states as can be seen in columns 4-6. The lagged treatment eect is only signicant at the ten percent level. This sharp immediate eect of MML is perhaps more dicult to explain than the lagged eect in violent crime, since it is unlikely that the drug market changed signicantly in at least the rst few months after the introduction of MML. However, as was already emphasized before, our placebo test shown in the next section places some doubts on the results for property crime, since we cannot determine whether the estimated treatment coecient is biased by a violation of the commontrend assumption.
Robustness Analysis
In our robustness analysis we focus on two issues. First, we test whether our results are correctly measuring the treatment eect of MML, or whether they are biased by dierences in trends in the outcome variable between treatment and control states. Second, we test whether the heterogeneity in the treatment eect between Mexican-border states and inland states may be driven by dierences in the characteristics of the MML, rather than proximity to Mexican DTOs. Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed above in state s at time t. The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the log of the property crime rate, similarly dened. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state xed eects, year xed eects, control variables and state-specic linear time trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Apart from these issues, we have performed several robustness checks for our main results in table 3, which are reported in the appendix. First, we ran the main regressions with unweighted, instead of population-weighted OLS. This could potentially inuence the results at the Mexican border, since the population in California is more than twice as large as the combined population of the other two MML states at the Mexican border.
Second, we ran the regressions allowing for a dierential treatment eect for each state that introduced MML at the Mexican Border. This allows us to determine whether the eect of MML at the Mexican border is driven by a California-specic eect.
Third, in accordance with the literature, our MML dummy variable takes value 1 for a given year if MML was introduced in that year. This likely attenuates our estimated treatment eect, since when MML are introduced in, for example, December 2010, it is unlikely that it has a signicant eect on anything during 2010. Therefore in a robustness check we round the date of the MML instead, such that MML introduced in January-June lead to a change in the MML dummy variable in the same year, while changes in the period July-December lead to a change in the variable in the next year.
Fourth, we looked into the eect of Mexican law enforcement on crime in the US. In particular, the election victory of ocials from the Mexican conservative party PAN (National Action Party) resulted in an increase in law enforcements eorts on prosecuting DTOs (see e.g. Dell, 2014) . If DTO violence in the US has decreased due to the election victory of PAN, this could bias our estimated treatment eect in Mexican border states downwards. Therefore, we ran our regressions with a dummy variable for the PAN electoral victory in 2006 interacted with the Mexican-border dummy.
Fifth, we ran regressions with a separate treatment eect for the Canadian-border region and a dummy for an announcement at the interior states. Finally, we controlled for spillovers from neighbor states. In all these exercises, except the dierential treatment eect of Arizona, MML at the Mexican border had a signicant negative eect on violent crime and our results remained virtually unchanged. In the regression with dierential treatment eects per state the indicator for Arizona was of negative sign, but not signicant, perhaps because Arizona introduced MML 2 years before the end of the sample period such that there are too few observations for this state.
Placebo Test
To perform a dierence-in-dierences analysis one must assume that the outcome variable follows the same trend in treatment and control states, absent of treatment. We test whether this common-trend assumption is satised by creating a placebo test where we include the lead of the MML dummy in our regression. The test works under the following premise. The announcement eect of MML at the Mexican border are likely negligible. All MML in Mexican border states were enacted immediately after a public vote, which for each of the three Mexican border states with MML was a close call. Moreover, even if criminals anticipated the enactment of MML, it is not clear what kind of dierent behavior they would exhibit during the announcement period. Therefore, the lead of MML cannot causally decrease the crime rate. Hence, the lead of the MML variable, in a specication which only contains this lead, should be attenuated with respect to the coecient in our base regression. Additionally, we expect that the coecient on the lead is non-signicant and close to zero if we include both the lead and the actual treatment variable.
However, if our results are driven by the fact that the outcome variable follows a dierent trend in treatment than in control states, the coecient on the lead of MML are likely of similar magnitude to the coecient on the actual treatment variable. Additionally, in a specication that contains both the lead and the actual treatment variable, the treatment coecient should be much closer to zero in comparison to the base regression, and the lead coecient should be of approximately equal magnitude to the coecient on the actual treatment variable. We perform this placebo test with two leads of the MML treatment dummy. Table 10 reports the results.
Column 1 presents the baseline estimate for the eect of MML on violent crime. As can be seen, in column 2 and 3 the one-and two-year leads of MML at the Mexican border do not have a signicant eect on violent crime when considered in isolation. As expected, the coecient in column 2 is closer to zero than the one in column 1, while the coecient in column 3 is almost zero. Column 4 shows a specication that contains both leads of MML and the MML variable itself. In this specication, the value of the MML coecient is virtually unaected with respect to the base estimate, while the coecients on the leads of MML at the Mexican border are close to zero. This provides strong evidence that our result on violent crime is driven by a treatment eect, rather than by dierences in crime trends between the treatment and the control states.
The results for property crime are less clear cut. In a specication with only the one-year lead of MML at the Mexican border the coecient for the lead is signicant at the 1 percent level, as can be seen in column 6. In addition, in the specication with both leads and the actual treatment the coecient on the one year lead is signicant, while the actual treatment eect is smaller than in our base estimates, as can be seen in column 8. This indicates that any result we derive for the property crime rate must be interpreted with care, since we cannot exclude the possibility that (part of) our estimate for the treatment coecient for property crime is driven by a violation of the common trend assumption.
Characteristics
We also assess the robustness of our result with respect to the characteristics of dierent MML. In particular, Alford (2014) shows that MML which allow for dispensaries increase the violent and property crime rate, while MML which only allow for home cultivation have a nonsignicant impact on crime. If the dierences in MML correlate with proximity to the Mexican border, our estimated treatment eect may be biased by the dierence in MML between inland states and Mexican border states.
To test whether this is the case we create three new dummy variables. The rst takes value 1 when MML are introduced. The second takes value 1 the moment a state allows for home cultivation. The nal treatment dummy takes value 1 either when a state legalizes dispensaries or when dispensaries start operating. The treatment eect is again split between states at the Mexican border, and other states, with the exception of the MML dummy, since all MML states at the Mexican border immediately allowed for home cultivation. The overall treatment eect of a state at the Mexican border which allows for both home cultivation and dispensaries is therefore the sum of the coecient for home cultivation and dispensaries at the Mexican border. The overall treatment eect at a state in the interior of the US which allows for home cultivation and dispensaries is the sum of the coecients for the respective dummies for characteristics and the dummy for MML at the interior. Table 9 presents our results. Column 1 and 3 show the results for each major crime category when we use the date at which dispensaries were legally allowed at the state level. This variable was used previously in Pacula et al. (forthcoming) and Alford (2014) . With this dummy we replicate the results by Alford (2014) in the sense that allowing for dispensaries is Note: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed above in state s at time t.
The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the log of the property crime rate, similarly dened. The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The variables "1 year before MML" are dummies which take a value one a year before the introduction of MML. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state xed eects, year xed eects, control variables and state-specic linear time trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
positively correlated to violent crime in non-border states, and to property crime in Mexican border states. Nonetheless, our main result, which shows that MML decrease overall violent crime in the Mexican border states, remains unaected. To see this note that the overall treatment eect of MML, the sum of the coecient of home cultivation and for dispensaries, is negative at the Mexican border. When we include the rst opening of a licensed dispensary, instead of the state-wide allowance of dispensaries, this result disappears. Dispensaries at the Mexican border have a negative eect on both violent and property crime, and dispensaries in inland states do not aect the crime rate at all. Additionally, the eect of home cultivation at the Mexican border on crime becomes smaller, and in the case of violent crime even insignicant.
This latter result could be seen as giving some indirect evidence for our theory. In particular, the opening of dispensaries will likely give a far stronger boost to US production of marijuana than the allowance of home cultivation. As such, Mexican DTOs and their aliated gangs are likely negatively aected by the opening of licensed dispensaries. Hence, we see a reduction in crime, in particular, once Mexican border states allow for dispensaries. However, we should note that identication on the eect of dispensaries is rather weak. In particular, for the three states at the Mexican border, California's rst licensed dispensary opened one year after the adoption of MML. For New Mexico and Arizona this occurred two years after MML were adopted. If we take into account that MML may have a delayed impact on crime, we cannot be certain whether the estimated coecient for dispensaries is related to the dispensaries, or to a delayed eect of the adoption of the MML itself.
Conclusion
In this paper we provide indirect evidence for the theory that Medical Marijuana Laws (MML) decrease crimes committed by Mexican Drug Tracking Organizations (DTOs) in the US. We exploit a quasi-experimental variation of MML, which were gradually introduced in several states at dierent points in time. We explore the eect of MML on crime at the Mexican Border states through the lenses of three dierent datasets. First, we use the Uniform Crime Reports to nd the overall eect of MML introduction on crime. We nd that MML have signicantly reduced violent crimes in Mexican border states, most prominent among them, robberies and homicides. Second, we explore the circumstances under which homicides were committed through the Supplementary Homicides Reports data. We nd that the drop in homicides is driven by a drop in drug law and juvenile gang related homicides, lending support to the hypothesis that the drop in crime is related to activity in drug markets. Third, we look at the eect on MML on drug seizures and prices as recorded by the STRIDE dataset. We observe a drop in the number of seizures as well as the quantity seized for both crack cocaine and powdered cocaine after MML are introduced in Mexican border states. Moreover, we observe an increase in the price of powdered cocaine. This provides evidence for a negative supply shock in illicit drug markets after introduction of MML in Mexican border states. All these results are consistent with the theory that MML are negatively aecting the large Mexican DTOs.
The magnitude of each of the identied eects is surprisingly large. In particular, the gap in violent crime rates between inland states and border states prior to MML is 20 percent. Our estimates suggests the introduction of an MML closes this gap by 30 percent, even though MML only open the door for small-scale production of marijuana. This is consistent with the idea that marijuana is the "bread and butter" of Mexican DTOs. Although there is some evidence that DTOs are switching activity to crimes unrelated to drugs such as human tracking, none of these activities exhibit the same scale and prot commonly associated with the tracking of marijuana. Extrapolating from our results, we consider it likely that the full legalization of marijuana in Colorado and Washington will have an even stronger impact on the DTOs as large-scale marijuana production facilities are erected in these states.
The case of MML provides an important lesson for policy makers. Drug markets are wellknown for their violence. However, in the case of marijuana when the supply chain of the drug is legalized, or at least decriminalized, a lot of the violence disappears and the business of organized crime structures is hurt. In this light, the war on drugs seems counterproductive in the sense that it has little eect on the availability of marijuana, but large negative eects on violent crime related to the drug.
An important caveat of this study and other studies on crime is the focus on the property and violent crime categories reported in UCR, and to drug crimes reported in STRIDE. To our knowledge, a similar database on crimes such as extortion, human tracking and fraud is not available. Therefore, our study cannot assert whether these crimes, which are sometimes associated to activity of Mexican DTOs, are aected by MML. Collecting these crimes in a nationwide database would provide researchers in (the economics of) crime with an opportunity to study them in more detail. Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed above in state s at time t. The dependent variable in columns 6-10 is the log of the property crime rate, similarly dened. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state xed eects and year xed eects. Control variables and state-specic linear time trends were used where denotes. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks denote: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Variables: The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. The rst and sixth columns present the preferred specication, where standard errors are clustered at the state level and regressions are populations weighted. The second and seventh columns present unweighted estimates, while the third, fourth, eighth and ninth column present estimates with bootstrapped standard errors. The fth and tenth columns disentangle the eect of the MML on each state at the Mexican Border. Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the log of the violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants of the crime listed above in state s at time t.
The dependent variable in columns 5-8 is the log of the property crime rate, similarly dened. The regressions underlying the presented results were all estimated with state xed eects, year xed eects, control variables and state-specic linear time trends. The included control variables are an indicator for decriminalization policy, the unemployment rate, logged income per capita, and the shares of males, African-Americans, Hispanics, age 15-24, and age 25-34 in the population. The panel covers the period 1990-2012. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Regressions are populations weighted. Asterisks denote: * * * p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Variables: The MML variables are dummies which take value one from the moment MML are enacted. 
